AuthoritarianismandtheEliteOriginsofDemocracy

This book argues that democracy does not necessarily reset the political game after displacing authoritarianism, both in terms of institutional design and the experiences of citizens. Often, democratic institutions are designed by the previous authoritarian regime to protect the interests of incumbent elites and give them an unfair advantage.

作者简介

Thisbookarguesthat-intermsofinstitutionaldesign,theallocationofpowerandprivilege,andthelivedexperiencesofcitizens-democracyoftendoesnotrestartthepoliticalgameafterdisplacingauthoritarianism.Democraticinstitutionsarefrequentlydesignedbytheoutgoingauthoritarianregimetoshieldincumbentelitesfromtheruleoflawandgivethemanunfairadvantageoverpoliticsandtheeconomyafterdemocratization.AuthoritarianismandtheEliteOriginsofDemocracysystematicallydocumentsandanalyzestheconstitutionaltoolsthatoutgoingauthoritarianelitesusetoaccomplishtheseends,suchaselectoralsystemdesign,legislativeappointments,federalism,legalimmunities,constitutionaltribunaldesign,andsupermajoritythresholdsforchange.Thestudyprovideswide-rangingevidencefortheseclaimsusingdatathatspanstheglobeanddatesfrom1800tothepresent.AlbertusandMenaldoalsoconductdetailedcasestudiesofChileandSweden.Indoingso,theyexplainwhysomedemocraciessuccessfullyoverhaultheirelite-biasedconstitutionsformoreegalitariansocialcontracts.