《现象学入门》「非对象化意向性」探索：现象学的初级问题

一、疑问

如下图所示，在本书第六章中提到：胡塞尔区分了两种类型的意向性：一是行为意向性，第二便是「非对象化意向性样式」，这个到底是什么意思呢？

二、中文版上下文

现象学研究从实际情形推进到本质，但本质本身并不是分析的终点。关注本质并不是目的，而是一种手段，以此来对我们实际生存的深度进行理解、概念化并加以表达。关注本质结构，是由于我们想要把实际性中的丰富多彩给刻画出来，而不是因为我们意欲忽视实际情形并从中脱离出来。

意向性分析，即对意识的指向性（directedness）或有关性（aboutness）的分析，常常被称作是现象学的核心成就之一。我们不仅仅是在爱、怕、看、判断，而是在爱其所爱、怕其所怕、看见一个对象、判断一个事态。无论我们讨论的是知觉、思维、判断、幻想、怀疑、期待还是回忆，这些种种不同意识样式都被刻画为对于某对象的意向。若不考虑其对象相关项，即知觉、怀疑或期待对象，那么我们便无法准确分析这些意识样式。因此，对主体而言，触及对象并不是个问题，因为主体之存在就是意向性的。也就是说，主体本身就是超出自身的，本身就指向了某个和它自身不同的东西。现象学极为详尽地描述了我们理论性的对象指向性，但除此之外，它也向我们表明，在一切分析、界定和对象化之前，世界已经被给予。简言之，有一种前理论、非理论的世界关联。正如梅洛-庞蒂所指出的那样，这也就是为什么胡塞尔区分了两种类型的意向性。一种是胡塞尔曾在《逻辑研究》中提到过的行为意向性，这是一种对象化意向性样式。同时也还有另一种更为基础的、被动的或说运转中的非对象化意向性样式，胡塞尔在部分后期研究中对此进行了细致分析。按梅洛-庞蒂的说法，我们无法再进一步解释或分析这种原初的、基本的世界关联。现象学所能做的一切，不过是唤起我们对这种关联的关注，并让我们尊重它的不可还原性。

三、英文版上下文

The phenomenological investigation proceeds from the factual to the essential, but that is not where the analysis ends. The focus on the essential is not the goal, but a means to understand, conceptualize, and articulate the depth of our factual existence. The focus on essential structures is due to a wish to capture the richness of the factual, and not because of a desire to abstract from and ignore facticity.

The analysis of intentionality, the analysis of the directedness or aboutness of consciousness, is often presented as one of the central accomplishments of phenomenology. One does not merely love, fear, see, or judge; one loves a beloved, fears something fearful, sees an object, and judges a state of affairs. Regardless of whether we are talking about a perception, thought, judgment, fantasy, doubt, expectation, or recollection, all of these diverse forms of consciousness are characterized by intending objects and cannot be analyzed properly without a look at their objective correlate, e.g., the perceived, doubted, or expected object. It is, consequently, not a problem for the subject to reach the object, since its being is intentional. That is, the subject is per se self-transcending, per se directed towards something different from itself. But apart from having analyzed our theoretical object-directedness in great detail, phenomenology has also made it clear that the world is given prior to any analysis, identification, and objectification. There is, in short, a pre- and a theoretical relation to the world. As Merleau-Ponty points out, this is why Husserl distinguished two types of intentionality. There is what Husserl in the Logical Investigations called act-intentionality, which is an objectifying form of intentionality. But there is also a more fundamental passive or operative form of non-objectifying intentionality, which Husserl analyzed in detail in some of his later works. According to Merleau-Ponty, this original and basic world-relation cannot be explained or analyzed further. All phenomenology can do is to call attention to it and make us respect its irreducibility.

四、我的理解

1.在引出「非对象化意向性」这个概念之前，作者主要在分析与之相反的概念，即：对象化的意向性。在第一段，作者强调意向性是指向性或有关性，必然涉及对象。

2.经过一些解释后，在"但除此之外"进行了一个转折。作者提出，在进行分析和对象化之前，世界已经存在，这是作者对意向性的前、非理论关联的观点。

3.也就是说，在人类具备分析能力和对象化能力之前，人与世界之间存在一种无法再进一步解释或分析的基础关联。这种关联被称作是「非对象化意向性」。

4.「非对象化意向性」是指更为基础、被动或运转中的意向性样式。胡塞尔在一些后期的研究中对此进行了细致分析。

5.最后一句话强调无法再进一步解释或分析这种原初的、基本的世界关联。这与之前提到的世界在分析和对象化之前已经存在的观点相呼应。

6.文中也提到了胡塞尔在部分后期研究中对非对象化意向性进行了细致分析，但没有具体提及是哪些研究或著作。